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Abstract—The most widely used technique for IP geolocation
consists in building a database to keep the mapping between IP
blocks and a geographic location. Several databases are available
and are frequently used by many services and web sites in the
Internet. Contrary to widespread belief, geolocation databases
are far from being as reliable as they claim. In this paper, we
conduct a comparison of several current geolocation databases
-both commercial and free- to understand the limitations in their
usability.
First, the vast majority of entries in the databases refer
only to a few popular countries (e.g., U.S.). This creates an
imbalance in the representation of countries across the IP blocks
of the databases. Second, these entries do not reflect the original
allocation of IP blocks, nor BGP announcements. In addition,
we quantify the accuracy of geolocation databases on a large
European ISP based on ground truth information, as well as
on two tier-1 ISPs based on DNS names containing geographic
clues. This is the first study using a ground truth showing that the
overly fine granularity of database entries makes their accuracy
worse, not better. Their blocks, often as fine as /29 prefixes, have
geolocations inaccurate by hundreds of kilometers in a significant
fraction of the cases. All in all, geolocation databases can claim
country-level accuracy, but certainly not city-level.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of Internet services requiring location
information, IP geolocation techniques (i.e., mapping an IP
address to the geographic location of the corresponding host)
becomes a key enabler for many of these services. Examples
of such services comprise targeted advertising on web pages,
displaying local events and regional weather, automatic selec-
tion of languages to first display content and restricted content
delivery following regional policies.
Two main paradigms exist to geolocate IP addresses: active
and passive. Active IP geolocation techniques, typically based
on delay measurements [1], [2], [3], [4], may achieve desir-
able properties such as accuracy (i.e., active measurements
provide better results compared to geolocation database in
many cases). However, these properties come at the expense
of lack of scalability, high measurement overhead, and very
high response time ranging from tens of seconds to several
minutes to localize a single IP address. This is several orders
of magnitude slower than what is achievable with the passive
approach, i.e., database-driven geolocation.
Database-driven geolocation usually consists of a database-
engine (e.g., SQL/MySQL) containing records for a range of
IP addresses, which are called blocks or prefixes. Geolocation
prefixes may span non-CIDR subsets of the address space,
and may span only a couple of IP addresses. Examples of
geolocation databases are GeoURL [5], the Net World Map
project [6], and are provided as free [7], [8], [9] or commercial
tools [10], [11], [12], [13], [14].
The other side of the coin with geolocation databases is
that, besides the difficulty to manage and update them, their
accuracy is more than questionable [15], [16], especially due
to lack of information about the methodology used to build
them. The crux of the problem is that prefixes within databases
are not clearly related to IP prefixes as advertised in the
routing system, nor to how those routing prefixes are used
by their owners (e.g., ISPs, enterprises, etc). Indeed, even if
many commercial geolocation databases claim to provide a
sufficient geographic resolution, e.g., at the country-level, their
bias towards specific countries make us doubt their ability to
geolocate arbitrary end-hosts in the Internet.
Few works focus on geolocation databases and their ac-
curacy. Freedman et al. studied the geographic locality of
IP prefixes based on active measurements [17]. Siwpersad
et al. assessed the geographic resolution of geolocation data-
bases [16]. Based on active measurements, the authors of [16],
[17] showed the inaccuracies of geolocation databases by
pinpointing the natural geographic span of IP addresses blocks.
In this paper, we go further by questioning the reliability
of the information contained in geolocation databases. As the
databases are expected to be able to correctly geolocate IP ad-
dresses, we find a surprising low number of unique geographic
locations, tens of thousands, compared to the large number of
blocks (up to several millions) in many databases. In addition,
we observe that a few countries are over-represented in these
databases, making the geographic sampling of the databases
not fairly spread across the world.
One of our salient findings is that these entries do not
reflect the address space of IP blocks as originally allocated to
their owners or as announced by BGP. Locations discrepancies
between the databases, coupled with the fine granularity of
their blocks, often /29, shed serious doubt on the accuracy of
their geolocation.
Finally, to confirm our doubts about the inability of data-
bases to provide city-level accuracy, we confront the geo-
locations of three databases on the prefixes advertised by
several large ISPs, based on ground truth information. We find
that most of the blocks of the databases incorrectly geolocate
2prefixes, with errors being systematically in the order of a few
hundreds of kilometers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Sec. II provides a description of the five databases considered
throughout this paper; Sec. III investigates whether a geoloca-
tion database is constructed following one or several objective
criteria; Sec. IV determines whether geolocation databases are
reliable; Sec. V-A confronts three commercial databases with
the network of a large European ISP for which ground truth is
available, while Sec. V-B confronts the same three databases
with the network of two tier-1 ISPs, based on DNS names
containing geographic clues. Finally, Sec. VI concludes this
paper by summarizing its main achievements.
II. DATASET
Database Blocks (lat; long) Countries Cities
HostIP 8,892,291 33,680 238 23,700
IP2Location 6,709,973 17,183 240 13,690
InfoDB 3,539,029 169,209 237 98,143
Maxmind 3,562,204 203,255 244 175,035
Software77 99,134 227 225 0
TABLE I
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDIED GEOLOCATION DATABASES
In this paper, we consider five IP geolocation databases.
Two are commercial (Maxmind [14] and IP2Location [12])
and three are freely available (InfoDB [8], HostIP [7], and
Software77 [9]). Although these databases share some infor-
mation about their construction processes, comments about
how they are built are vague and technically evasive. As
reported in [8], InfoDB is, for instance, built upon the free
Maxmind database version, and incremented by the IANA
(Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) locality information.
The HostIP database is based on users’ contributions. Finally,
Software77 is managed by Webnet77, an enterprise offering
Web hosting solutions.
Typically, a geolocation database entry is composed of a pair
of values, corresponding to the integer representation of the
minimum and maximum address of a block. Each block is then
associated with several information helpful for localization:
country code, city, latitude and longitude, and Zip code.
Table I shows the number of entries (i.e., the number of IP
blocks) recorded in each database (column labeled “Blocks”).
Most databases contain several millions of IP blocks. Only
Software77 has much less entries: 99, 134. HostIP has the
highest number of entries because it is composed exclusively
of /24 prefixes. Compared to the more than 300, 000 prefixes
advertised in BGP routing, one might be led to believe that
the geographic resolution of the geolocation databases is much
finer than the natural one from BGP routing [17].
Table I provides also the number of countries and cities
retrieved from the databases locations. From the number of
countries, we can infer that most of the world countries are
covered. However, containing blocks for most countries does
not imply that countries are properly sampled, neither from
an address space perspective nor from a geographic location
one. Fig. 1 shows the cumulative fraction of blocks from
Fig. 1. Common countries distribution
the databases across countries. Note that countries on Fig. 1
(horizontal axis) have been alphabetically ordered based on
their ISO country codes.
Again, we stress the number of countries represented in
all databases that gives the impression that they cover fairly
all countries in the world. This is misleading as more than
45% of the entries in these databases are concentrated in
a single country: the United States (see Fig. 1). The five
databases display a similar shape of their cumulative number
of blocks across countries. The big jump around country 230
corresponds to the over-representation of the U.S in terms of
database blocks compared to other countries. It is worth to
notice that countries distribution observed in whois database
(see Fig. 1) presents the same behavior than geolocation
databases.
From Table I, we also notice the strong difference between
the number of IP blocks and the number of unique (latitude,
longitude) pairs. The perfect example of this is HostIP. While
it contains roughly 8 millions of IP blocks, those blocks only
refer to 33, 000 (latitude, longitude) pairs. This observation
casts some doubts upon the true geographic resolution of the
databases.
III. DATABASE CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we investigate whether the construction of
geolocation databases follows some global patterns. We focus
on two aspects. First, we check how similar the blocks of
the databases are from the official address allocations and
prefixes advertised in BGP routing (Sec. III-A). Second, we
evaluate whether the construction of a database follows any
demographic property, such as the amount of connected users
in a given country (Sec. III-B).
A. Prefixes
Comparing the subnet size of database entries with those
from the official allocations by the Internet routing registries
and BGP routing tables is enlightening (see Fig. 2). HostIP is
not plotted as it is exclusively made of /24 prefixes. We show
results as for the period of February 2010, but it is worth
noticing that we observed similar results for other periods in
2009.
3Fig. 2. Prefix distribution
Most allocated blocks and BGP prefixes are between /16 and
/24. Very few allocations and BGP prefixes are subnets smaller
than 256 IP addresses (/24). BGP prefixes are slightly more
de-aggregated than the original allocations. The Software77
database is made of entries that have the same subnet size
distribution as the original address space allocation. 95.97% of
the entries in Software77 correspond to IP blocks as allocated
in February 2010. As expected from their sheer size, the other
databases have a significant fraction of their blocks smaller
than /24 subnets. These databases split official address space
allocations and BGP prefixes into finer blocks.
Prefixes advertised by BGP and allocated blocks could,
however, constitute a first approximation to the databases
entries. Nevertheless, most of the IP blocks from Maxmind
and IP2Location correspond to subnets smaller than /25. In
essence, Maxmind and IP2location entries substantially differ
from BGP and official allocations by more than 50% from a
blocks size perspective. With such fine IP blocks, we should
expect a very high geographic accuracy. Again, because the
way these databases are built is kept secret, we can only
infer some of their characteristics. In particular, from these
first observations, all the studied databases, except Software77,
are clearly not related to official allocations and BGP routing
tables. Even if the entries would closely match allocated or
advertised prefixes, we would not expect that the locations
attributed to them in the databases would be reliable. We
believe this because the locations contained in the databases
do not have to be related to how address space is actually
allocated and used by its owners. We will demonstrate this
point in Sec. IV and V.
B. Internet Demographics
The Internet is a worldwide communication infrastructure.
Its deployment and usage however differ across different re-
gions of the world. In the same way as address space allocation
is biased towards certain regions of the world, geolocation
databases should also reflect their usage. It is worth to notice
that, throughout this section, we only focus on the countries
that are common to all databases.
1) Internet Users: A factor that is likely to explain the
number of databases blocks kept per country is the amount of
Internet users per country, i.e., the number of people in a given
Fig. 3. Fraction of database prefixes as a function of Internet users
country being connected to the Internet. The more popular the
Internet in a given country, the more we expect to see entries
in the databases for this country. Internet users statistics are
from 31st December 2009 [18].
We consider each country seen in the databases1, and rank
them according to the amount of people connected to the
Internet (horizontal axis of Fig. 3 in logarithmic scale). We
then compute the fraction of blocks recorded in the different
databases for each value of the number of Internet users and
plot it in a cumulative way (vertical axis of Fig. 3).
Fig. 3 shows that there is a strong relationship between the
number of Internet users in a country and the importance of
that country in the databases in terms of IP blocks. Countries
with less than 1 million users are more or less non-existent.
There is an exception to the general tendency drawn in
Fig. 3: a few countries with a large amount of population
connected to the Internet are under-represented. The perfect
example of this is China with roughly 400 million Internet
users but a low database representation (between 1% and 5%,
depending on the database). Others examples are India, Japan,
or Germany. The most represented country, U.S., is also one
of the countries with the largest community of Internet users
(roughly 230 million people).
In addition, we cross-checked the amount of Internet users
per country with the whole population of a country, leading
so to an Internet penetration rate (results are not shown here
due to space constraints). In essence, more than 75% of the
countries recorded in all the databases have a penetration rate
higher than 0.6. The more popular the Internet among the
population, the more frequent the country within the databases
entries.
Geolocation databases are therefore clearly biased towards
Internet usage. Again we note that HostIP is much more
impacted than the other databases by the over-representation
of the U.S. in its entries. This is expected since HostIP is
based on users contributions, that are most likely to be U.S.
Internet users.
2) Per-capita GDP: We expected that geolocation data-
bases not only target countries with many Internet users.
Furthermore, given that databases are used for electronic
1Thus assuming that the country given in the database is correct for any
given block, which is reasonable.
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commerce, we also expect that they target Internet users that
are more likely to spend money on electronic transactions. We
therefore expect that the economic importance is reflected in
the geolocation databases. We capture economic importance
through the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). We
choose this measure because most economists use it when
looking at per-capita welfare and comparing living conditions
or use of resources across countries. Internet users statistics
are from 31st December 2009 [18].
Fig. 4 is similar to Fig. 3, but instead of Internet users, the
horizontal axis shows the per capita GDP (in US dollar). In
addition, we point several countries (China, Italy, Germany,
and United States) on Fig. 4
We observe a strong correlation between the number of pre-
fixes in the databases and the per capita GDP. Indeed, countries
with higher incomes have more opportunity to benefit from
Internet services (Internet access, electronic commerce, online
games, etc.) than those with low incomes. As a consequence,
it is not necessary for geolocation databases to keep a lot of
entries for countries having a low per capita GDP.
It is worth noticing that income, education, age are the
principal factors determining the profile of Internet users. So,
this exception can be explained by the fact that most of chinese
is located to rural areas, and thus can have either a lack of
computer skills or “no need” of getting online. Nevertheless,
nowadays with the growth in the number of Internet users in
China one can expect a rise of the number of entries hosted
by China in new geolocation databases.
Fig. 3 also illustrates the rapid growth of country frequency
according to the number of users upper than 1,000,000. Indeed,
more a country owns an important number of users, more
the country’s appearances increases in databases. It should be
noted that, these broad patterns are noticed for all countries
considered as rich (e.g USA, Germany).
The first factor that is likely to explain how many prefixes
databases keep per country is the Internet penetration rate, i.e.,
the percentage of the population being connected to Internet.
The more popular Internet is in a given country, the more we
expect to see entries in geolocation databases for this country.
The big jump observed in Fig. 5 around 0.7 is due to
the number of prefixes owned by the United States in all
databases. Besides, we observe a high correlation between
the Internet penetration rate and the number of entries in the
Fig. 5. Fraction of database prefixes as a function of Internet penetration
rate
database. In essence, more than 75% of the countries recorded
in all the databases have a penetration rate higher than 0.6.
Put simply, the more popular Internet among the population,
the more frequent the country within the databases entries. It
should be noted that one country, the Falkland Islands, has an
Internet penetration rate of 1, i.e. all users are connected to
the Internet. Geolocation databases are therefore clearly biased
towards Internet usage. Again we note though that, HostIP is
much more impacted than the other databases by the over
representation of US in its entries. This is expected since
HostIP is based on users contributions, that are most likely
US Internet users that do provide US locations.
IV. DATABASES RELIABILITY
In this section, we are interested to know whether geoloca-
tion databases are reliable. By reliable we mean that consider-
ing mutual comparison for a given IP address, the geolocation
provided by the databases is the same (or very close). To
this end, we perform an experiment based on a large set of
randomly generated IP addresses. We evaluate to which extent
databases’ answers would match when geolocating arbitrary IP
addresses
To this end, we perform two kind of experiments. First, we
compute the intersection between each pair of databases, and
verify whether the geolocation provided for the intersection
is the same in the databases pair (Sec. IV-A). Second, based
on a large set of randomly generated IP addresses, we eval-
uate to which extent databases’ answers would match when
geolocating arbitrary IP addresses (Sec. IV-B).
A. Databases Overlap
In this section, we consider the overlap that might exist
between the five studied databases. First, we observe the
common entries that the databases may share. The intersection
has been computed by considering that two blocks match if
they have the same starting IP address. As the distribution
of block sizes strongly differ from one database to another
(see Fig. 2), requiring an exact match on the first and last IP
address of a block would have led to a very small intersection
size. Table II shows the size of the intersection between
the databases. Other non shown intersections are empty. The
5Database 1 Database 2 Size
InfoDB
HostIP 19,481
IP2Loc 5,213
Maxmd 4,725
Soft77 124
Maxmd IP2Loc 2,701,034Soft77 84,469
Soft77 IP2Loc 85,577
TABLE II
DATABASES INTERSECTION SIZE.
Fig. 6. Database differences for intersections
largest intersection occurs between Maxmind and IP2location
that share 2, 701, 034 IP blocks. This is more than 75% of the
number of blocks of Maxmind. The other pairs of databases
share very few blocks. Based on this observation, one might be
tempted to think that IP2Location and Maxmind share similar
methodologies to construct their databases’ entries.
We evaluate how these common blocks are localized by the
databases. We want to understand whether common blocks
also share common locations. Fig. 6 depicts the CDF of the
distance differences (x-axis, logarithmic scale) as returned
by the pairs of studied databases for the common blocks.
Software77 has not been included in the plot as it only returns
countries, but no (latitude, longitude) pairs. The majority of
blocks in common between Maxmind and InfoDB (65%) share
the same localizations. This is expected since InfoDB is built
originally from the free Maxmind database and augmented
with other sources such as IANA assignments. However,
the proportion of shared locations for other databases pairs
is very low. For instance, although they share a significant
proportion of prefixes, IP2Location and Maxmind do localize
only a tiny proportion of these common prefixes in the same
locations (1.7%). We can conclude that even though their
blocks selection methodology is quite similar, the process of
assigning locations to the entries differs substantially. This
suggests that the databases rely on very different location input
and methodologies. In turn, widely differing methodologies
cast doubts on the ability of any database to accurately
geolocate Internet hosts. between IP2Location and Maxmind,
for instance).
B. Location Discrepancy
Now, we consider the differences in geolocation across
databases when randomly sampling IP addresses across the
Fig. 7. Database discrepancies for randomly generated IP addresses
Fig. 8. Database discrepancies for CDNs
available blocks.
We randomly generate 106 IP addresses, each byte of an
address being randomly selected between 0 and 255. We then
geographically localize each of those IP addresses using four
databases: Maxmind, IP2Location, HostIP, and InfoDB. Then,
we evaluate the difference between the locations returned by
each database pair (in km), assuming that these locations are
correct. Note that Software77 is not considered here as the
number of recorded blocks is too small.
Fig. 7 plots the cumulative distribution of distance dif-
ference (in km - x-axis in logarithmic scale) for the four
considered databases. We notice first that a low proportion
of IP addresses are identically geolocated by a given pair
of databases. For instance, in only 5% of the cases, InfoDB
and Maxmind provide the same answer. This is roughly the
same proportion for HostIP and InfoDB. Fig. 7 confirms that
these databases disagree on a vast majority of IP addresses
locations. In particular in all our comparisons more than 50%
of the provided locations are at least 100km away from each
other. Interestingly enough, locations as returned by Maxmind
exhibits the largest distance differences compared to other
databases, with more than half of the sampled error distances
larger than 7, 000 km.
Finally, it is worth noticing that we obtained very similar
results to the random 106 IP addresses when using a set of
30, 000 IP addresses collected from various content delivery
networks (CDNs), as demonstrated by Fig. 8.
6Exact Smaller Larger Partial
IP2Location 32,429 70,963 3,531 373
Maxmind 27,917 79,735 4,092 128
InfoDB 9,954 51,399 1,763 104
TABLE III
MATCHING PREFIXES FROM AN EUROPEAN ISP AGAINST IP2LOCATION,
MAXMIND AND INFODB
V. ASSESSING DATABASES ACCURACY ON ISP ADDRESS
SPACE
In this section, we first confront three databases with the
network of a large European ISP for which we have ground
truth about its allocated prefixes and their geographic locations
(Sec. V-A). Because of the limited prefix range over which the
large European ISP provides ground truth, we augment our use
case with information as close as possible to ground truth –
DNS names that provide location hints – from two very large
transit ISPs (Sec. V-B). We limit ourselves to IP2Location,
Maxmind, and InfoDB because Software77 provides only a
per-country localization and HostIP is limited to /24 blocks.
A. ISP Ground Truth
We extracted the complete routing table from a backbone
router of a large European ISP. This dump contained a total
of about 380, 000 prefixes (both internal and external). From
these prefixes, those originated by the ISP were extracted.
This list was further trimmed down by dropping all entries not
advertised by the ISP to external networks. This leaves us with
357 BGP prefixes advertised by the ISP and reachable from
the global Internet that can be matched against the databases.
We call this set of prefixes the ground truth set, since we have
POP-level locations for them.
Fig. III shows how the blocks of the three geolocation
databases match the prefixes of the ISP (ground truth set).
Four outcomes are possible for the match: Exact (the block is
present and the same), Smaller (the block is present but smaller
in the database), Larger (the block is present but larger in the
database), and Partial (the block from the database overlaps
with one prefix from the ground truth set).
The number of geolocation blocks that are smaller than pre-
fixes from the ISP is almost as large as the full set of prefixes
from ground truth set. Surprisingly, the databases also have
prefixes that match exactly those from ground truth set in
about 40% (IP2Location), 34% (Maxmind), and 12% (InfoDB)
of the cases. Databases therefore rely on the official allocations
and advertisements from the ISP, but also try to split the
blocks into more specific subsets for geolocation purposes.
Few blocks from the databases are bigger than those advertised
by the ISP or partially match one from the ISP.
The next step is to extract the city-level position of the
routers advertising the subnets inside the ISP, giving us ground
truth about the actual location where the prefix is being used
by the ISP. To determine the exact location of the prefix, we
relied on a passive trace of all IGP messages of one of the
backbone routers of the ISP. Thanks to the internal naming
scheme of the ISP, we obtained GPS coordinates of the PoP
in which each backbone router lies, and associated each prefix
(a) exact match (b) subset match
Fig. 9. Geolocation error of databases for large ISP network with ground
truth information
advertised on that router to the location of the router. These
coordinates for each prefix are our ground truth used to assess
the accuracy of the databases.
Fig. 9 shows the distribution of the distances between the
position reported by IGP and the one reported by the data-
bases, when looking at blocks of the databases that do exactly
match (Fig. 9(a)) or are smaller than prefixes advertised by
the ISP (Fig. 9(b)). The x-axis (in log-scale) gives a distance
(in Km) that we consider as an error from the part of the
databases, given the ground truth from the ISP. A value of
10 on the x-axis, for instance, shows the fraction of database
prefixes that are less than 10Km away from the ground truth.
From exact matches (Fig. 9(a)), we observe that Maxmind
and InfoDB have the same distance distribution to the ground
truth (both curves overlap). This is due to the fact that InfoDB
is based on the free version of the Maxmind database. Less
than 20% of the exact matches for Maxmind and InfoDB are
within a few tens of Km from the ground truth. The rest of
the blocks have errors distributed between 10Km and 800Km.
Note that 800Km is the maximal distance in the country of
the considered ISP. IP2Location has much larger errors than
Maxmind and InfoDB for the exactly matching blocks, with
errors ranging between 200Km and 800Km.
For databases blocks smaller than the ISP prefixes
(Fig. 9(b)), we observe two interesting behaviors. First, In-
foDB and Maxmind have different error distributions, with
Maxmind being actually worse than InfoDB. This is unex-
pected given that InfoDB is based on the free version of
Maxmind. The explanation has to do with the commercial
version of the Maxmind database that splits the prefixes from
the ISP into very small blocks, many containing only eight IP
addresses. Splitting is intended to improve the accuracy of the
geolocation, but turns out to make geolocation worse given
that many small blocks have incorrect locations.
The second observation we make from Fig. 9(b) is the big
jump for IP2Location around an error of 400Km for about
50% of the blocks smaller than the ISP prefixes. By checking
those blocks, we notice that these belong to a few prefixes
from the ISP that are advertised but partly unused. These large
prefixes are currently advertised from a single location in the
ISP network. A large number of database blocks consistently
mislocate subsets of these prefixes.
We report the high success rates in providing the correct
7(a) Orange (b) Level3
Fig. 10. Distance to the destination distribution for DNS hints
country of the considered IP blocks (between 96% and 98%
depending on the database). We conclude that some databases
actually do a decent job at geolocating some of the address
space of the ISP. In most of the cases however, the location
given by the databases is off by several hundreds, even
thousands of kilometers. Furthermore, by trying to split the
address space into too small blocks, the databases do make
mistakes that are hard to detect unless one relies on ground
truth information from the ISP that owns the address space.
To conclude this section, we cannot trust the databases for the
ISP at the granularity of cities, especially given large relative
errors they make compared to the span of the considered
country (800Km). Their country-level information however
seems globally accurate.
B. DNS-based Assessment of Geolocation
Obtaining ground truth information about how allocated
address space is being used by ISPs, as we did in Sec. V-A,
is difficult since it requires access to confidential information,
e.g., IGP routing messages and router configuration. Without
such an information, assessing the accuracy of geolocation
database records can be done by carrying traceroutes towards
a prefix and trying to locate the prefix using location hints
from DNS names. Indeed, ISPs sometimes rely on naming
conventions for their routers [19].
We select the address space advertised by two tier-1 ISPs,
Level3 (AS 3356) and Orange (AS 3215), from BGP dump
of June, 30th 2010. All database records that belong to these
BGP prefixes are searched in geolocation databases, leading to
347,736 IP blocks. For each IP block, we perform traceroutes
towards the first IP address inside that block. Next we run a
DNS lookup for each IP address on the traceroute, starting
at the closest to the traceroute destination and working back-
wards through the traceroute until a DNS query succeeds in
resolving the IP address of the router on the path. As shown
in Fig. 10, in the vast majority of the cases, the hop with the
DNS name we use to estimate the IP block’s location is very
close to the traceroute destination. In addition, in 66% of the
cases, we succeed in resolving a DNS name. The DNS name
returned is then searched for location hints. A location hint
stands for a string that potentially indicates a city name. This
is done by parsing the DNS name looking for simple strings as
done by the UNDNS tool [19], and then querying the Google
maps service to find the likely location referred to by the hint.
(a) Orange (b) Level3
Fig. 11. Geolocation error of databases for tier-1 ISP networks based on
DNS information
If Google maps returns coordinates and a name matching the
hint for the location, we deem the IP block to be located close
to these coordinates. If more than one suggestion is provided,
or if no location hint is found in the DNS name, we simply
discard the IP block. We have then been able to find 158
locations (double-checked manually), leading to a DNS-based
estimation of the location for more than 165,000 IP blocks,
i.e. 48% of the original blocks.
In summary, for each IP block, we selected as its location
the geographic coordinates of the router that was closest in
hop count to an IP address from the IP block as seen from the
traceroutes and that returned a usable DNS name. We stress
that these considered locations are only estimations, and as
such would likely add an uncertainty of tens of kilometers
to the actual locations. However, these estimates can be good
indicators of whether geolocation databases’ returned locations
are sufficiently close to an hypothetical ground truth location.
On Fig. 11, we compare the distance inferred thanks to
the DNS hints, with the location provided by geolocation
databases. In a similar way to the ISP with ground truth
information (Fig. 9), the two tier-1 ISPs confirm the limited
accuracy of geolocation databases for most of the IP blocks.
Maxmind performs well in the case of Orange (see Fig. 11(a)),
thanks to the high concentration of block on a few cities,
e.g., Paris. Most of the blocks from Orange are located within
100Km of the location inferred thanks to DNS. For Level3 (see
Fig. 11(b)), more than 60% of the IP blocks are mislocated by
the databases by more than 100Km. Similarly to the European
ISP discussed in Sec. V-A, most of the blocks of Orange have
location errors bounded by the diameter of the country in
which the ISP has most of its address space, which is less
than 1, 000Km both for Orange and the European ISP. In the
case of Level3, location errors are larger than 1, 000Km for
more than 20% of the studied blocks.
Based on location hints provided by DNS names, we mea-
sured similar location errors of geolocation databases to those
measured based on ground truth information. By no means
do our measurements allow us to make general claims about
the accuracy of geolocation databases over the whole address
space. Much more extensive measurements are necessary
for this. However, given that the studied ISPs are mostly
present in Europe and the United States, we believe that the
different ISPs we studied cannot be unfortunate cases where
8geolocation databases happen to provide poor accuracy at the
city-level, and satisfactory accuracy only at the country-level.
Our findings here confirm our ground truth-based conclusions.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper questioned the reliability of several popular
geolocation databases. Given that these databases are fre-
quently used by many services and web sites in the Internet
and they do not provide much information about their infor-
mation sources, the quality of their geolocation information
should be checked.
Our findings indicate that geolocation databases often suc-
cessfully geolocate IP addresses at the country-level. However,
their bias towards a few popular countries, mostly those having
a large number of Internet users, makes them unusable as
general-purpose geolocation services. We observe significant
differences among the locations they return for a given IP
address, often in the order of hundreds of kilometers. Our
results based on a ground truth information from a large
Europen ISP, coupled with a study of two other major ISPs
where DNS names contain geographic clues, show that the
databases perform poorly on the address space of those ISPs.
One of the reasons we could identify for their poor geolocation
abilities is the way databases try to split prefixes advertised by
the studied ISPs into very small blocks. Instead of improving
the geolocation accuracy, significant errors are introduced for
a large number of blocks, especially at the city-level.
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